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FEDERAL COURTS AT THE CROSSROADS 
Roger J. Miner* 
The current bicentennial celebration, commemorating the 
framing of the United States Constitution, presents a special oppor-
tunity for judges and lawyers to become involved in educating their 
fellow citizens about our national charter and its implementation. 
The National Commission on the Bicentennial describes this impor-
tant occasion as 
an historic opportunity for all Americans to learn about and recall the achievements 
of our Founders and the knowledge and experience that inspired them, the nature 
of the government they established, its origins, its character, and its ends, and the 
rights and privileges of citizenship, as well as its attendant responsibilities.! 
I have written elsewhere of the "public obligations" of lawyers2 
and of the "communication responsibility" of judges.3 It seems to 
me that the entire legal profession has a special obligation to inform 
the public about the operation of the federal courts created under 
article III of the Constitution. It is most important that it do so 
now because, after functioning for almost two centuries, the federal 
courts are at the crossroads. In this article, I share some of my 
thoughts about the problems that have brought us to the cross-
roads, the effects those problems are having on our federal judicial 
system, and the path we should follow for the future. 
That there has been in recent years an expansion in the size of 
the federal judiciary and in the volume of the cases it handles is 
common knowledge. The extent of that expansion may not be so 
widely known. 
The framers of the Constitution contemplated a limited 
number of courts having a very restricted jurisdiction. Hamilton 
foresaw, in The Federalist No. 81, "four or five, or half a dozen" 
• Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit; Adjunct Professor, 
New York Law School. 
I. COMMISSION ON THE BICENTENNIAL OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, 
FIRST REPORT 6 (Sept. 17, 1985). 
2. Miner, A Judge's Advice to Today's Law Graduates, N.Y. ST. B.J., Nov. 1985, at 6, 
8. 
3. Miner, Victims and Witnesses: New Concerns in the Criminal Justice System, 30 
N.Y.L. ScH. L. REV. 757, 757 (1985). 
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federal districts.4 Today, there are 94 federal districts with 575 dis-
trict judges, and 13 federal circuits with 168 judges. Eighty-five of 
those judges, 61 in the district courts and 24 in the courts of appeal, 
hold seats first established by Congress in 1984.s But the creation 
of new judgeships has not kept pace with increasing caseloads, and 
already there are requests for yet more judgeships to be created.6 
From 1964 to 1984, the caseloads in the United States District 
Courts grew by 202 percent. 1 Between 1952 and 1982, while the 
nation's population increased by 50 percent, appeals to the circuit 
courts grew by 808 percent!s The growth continues. In 1985, more 
than 273,000 civil cases were filed in the nation's district courts, an 
increase of nearly 5 percent over 1984 and of almost 33 percent over 
1982.9 More than 39,000 criminal cases were filed in the district 
courts in 1985, 7 percent more than in 1984 and approximately 21 
percent more than in 1982.Jo In 1985, more than 33,000 appeals 
were filed in the circuit courts nationwide, about 6 percent more 
than in 1984 and almost 44 percent more than in 1980.11 In the 
Southern District of New York, civil case filings for 1985 exceeded 
those for 1984 by almost 6 percent, but the increase in criminal case 
filings for the same period was an astounding 51.5 percent.J2 In my 
circuit court, appeals filings increased from 2,153 in 1980 to 2,837 
in 1985, continuing the trend.IJ These statistics starkly illustrate 
the litigation explosion that has brought the federal courts to the 
gridlocked crossroads of which I speak. 
What are the causes of these massive caseloads? Where do the 
cases come from? It is a revealing statistic that more than 43 per-
cent of all civil actions filed in the district courts for the twelve-
month period ending June 30, 1985, are classified as statutory ac-
tions.J4 Included in this category of cases are state and federal pris-
oner petitions as well as civil rights, social security, labor law, 
4. THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 547 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961). 
S. Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, 28 U.S.C. §§ 44(a), 
133 (Supp. III 1985). 
6. E.g., 1984 JUD. CONF. U. S. REP. PROC. 53. 
7. Marvell, Are Caseloads Really Increasing?-Yes . .. , JUDGES' J., Summer 1986, at 
35, 44 (Table 3). 
8. /d. at 42 (Table 1). 
9. 1985 ADMIN. OFF. U.S. Crs., PICTORIAL SUMMARY 2 (hereinafter PICTORIAL 
SUMMARY]. 
10. /d. at 3. 
II. 1985 ADMIN. OFF. U.S. Crs., FED. Cr. MGMT. STATS. 30 (hereinafter MGMT. 
STATS.]. 
12. S. FLANDERS, SECOND CIRCUIT REPORT 31 (1985). 
13. /d. at 6 (Table 3). 
14. PICTORIAL SUMMARY, supra note 9, at 9 (Chart 3). 
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antitrust, tax, and various other statutory claims.1s While humor-
ists may say that no person's life or property is safe while Congress 
is in session, federal judges do have cause for alarm every time Con-
gress meets. During the closing days of the last session, for exam-
ple, major legislative programs affecting taxes, immigration, and 
drug abuse were enacted into law. Each of the new statutes eventu-
ally will require interpretation and enforcement in federal court 
proceedings, giving rise to more cases in the geometric progression 
of our workload. 
During 1985, more than 33,000 cases were filed in district 
courts by state and federal prisoners challenging their convictions 
under statutory provisions for habeas relief.l6 Filings under civil 
rights statutes rose to almost 20,000 cases nationwide in 1985.17 
Prisoners complaining of their conditions of confinement accounted 
for a great number of these cases as well. It is no secret that the 
great majority of prisoners' cases are without basis in law or fact. 
During my service as a district judge, I was confronted with a com-
plaint by an inmate who claimed that he was deprived of his civil 
rights because he received a failing grade in some course he was 
taking in prison. I well remember the particular case, because the 
inmate referred to himself throughout his papers as "your despon-
dent." I have the impression that these types of cases make many 
judges equally despondent. Many of the non-prisoner civil rights 
claims really are state tort claims for malicious prosecution and 
false arrest dressed up in constitutional finery. The lawyers make it 
clear that statutory provisions for fees to successful claimants1s 
make federal court practice very attractive in these cases. 
Many other types of statutory actions presently compete for 
attention in the article III courts. Social security cases, although 
subject to several tiers of administrative review, accounted for more 
than 19,000 filings in the district courts last year.l9 The civil RICO 
statute now permits ordinary fraud actions to be pursued in federal 
courts,2o and filings in these cases are increasing daily. Employ-
ment discrimination, labor law, Securities Act, and tax suits of vari-
ous kinds, all in ever greater numbers, arise under legislation 
enacted by Congress with little consideration given to the impact of 
that legislation on the courts. 
Of all the legislative activity of Congress in recent years, it 
15. /d. 
16. MGMT. STATS., supra note II, at 167 (pullout page). 
17. /d. 
18. E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982). 
19. MGMT. STATS., supra note II, at 167 (pullout page). 
20. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962, 1964 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). 
254 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 4:251 
seems to me that our national legislature has outdone itself in defin-
ing new crimes. Ever since the Supreme Court decided that crimi-
nal jurisdiction could be founded on a congressional declaration 
that interstate commerce was affected by what essentially is a local 
crime,21 the enthusiasm of Congress for enacting criminal laws has 
known no bounds. Here in New York City, federal prosecutors are 
using the federal courts to prosecute possession and sale of small 
amounts of drugs on the city streets. A thirty-dollar "buy and 
bust" case handled by city police officers recently found its way to 
our court.22 These types of cases not only add great volume to the 
federal courts, they also contribute to the federalization of the crim-
inallaw.23 The Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 added a 
number of new federal crimes that could just as well be prosecuted 
in local courts by state and local authorities. Among these is theft 
of livestock.24 The Act will have a special impact on the dockets of 
courts of appeals, because both prosecution and defense will be al-
lowed to appeal the length of sentences when the new sentencing 
guidelines become effective. 
At the beginning of the Republic there were grave concerns 
that the states would erect oppressive barriers to commerce, inter-
fere with mercantile trade, and prefer their own businessmen to bus-
inessmen from other states. One fear was that the citizens of one 
state would not get a fair shake in the courts of another state. Out 
of this fear diversity of citizenship jurisdiction was born. Today, we 
are told, there is little concern about a fair shake for businessmen. 
Lawyers are frank in arguing the benefits of retaining diversity-
choice of forum, liberal and uniform procedural rules, more knowl-
edgeable judges and juries, and even, until Congress acted recently, 
cheaper filing fees. Whatever the reasons for its retention, the fed-
eral courts are awash in diversity cases, and our judges are busy 
trying to ascertain and apply the laws of fifty states. Last fall, for 
example, I served on a panel confronted with the problem of inter-
preting a confusing Connecticut statute, which previously had been 
addressed by only two state trial courts.2s If that weren't bad 
enough, the presiding judge of our panel was constrained to recuse 
himself when he realized that he had been the Governor of Con-
necticut at the time the statute was enacted. In any event, there has 
21. Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971). 
22. United States v. Agilar, 779 F.2d 123 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1385 
(1986). 
23. See generally Miner, Federal Courts, Federal Crimes, and Federalism, 10 HARV. 
J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 1301 (1987). 
24. 18 U.S.C. § 667 (Supp. III 1985). 
25. Coffee v. Cutter Biological, 809 F.2d 191 (2d Cir. 1987). 
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been a tremendous increase in diversity filings in recent years, an 
increase that has made a significant impact on the workload of the 
federal courts. 
There are, of course, other causes for the federal court litiga-
tion explosion~xpansive judicial interpretations of various consti-
tutional and statutory provisions, a great increase in the number of 
lawyers, free legal services for indigent criminal defendants, and 
sharp increases in administrative review proceedings. In some dis-
tricts, the glut of criminal cases makes it almost impossible to 
schedule a civil case for trial, and the time necessary for disposition 
of civil cases is increasing everywhere. Judges are unable to devote 
the necessary time and attention to each case as the load increases, 
and there is an increasing use of magistrates and encouragement of 
alternate forms of dispute resolution in the district courts. More 
and more cases are being dismissed for minor violations of schedul-
ing orders. An impatient judiciary increasingly is turning to the use 
of sanctions to deter parties and attorneys from perceived violations 
of rules designed to prohibit unreasonable, vexatious or ungrounded 
litigation.26 Ironically enough, applications for the imposition of 
sanctions may give rise to yet more litigation.27 
It seems to me that the courts are beginning to relax the stan-
dards for summary judgment, and I do not believe that this devel-
opment is unrelated to the caseload crunch. Anderson v. Liberty 
Lobby, Inc. ,2s and Celotex Corporation v. Catrett,29 decided by the 
Supreme Court at its last Term, appear to encourage this trend. 
Chief Judge Feinberg of my court, in an opinion issued last fall, 
referred to a study demonstrating a 79 percent affirmance rate on 
appeals to our court from orders granting summary judgment.Jo 
The Chief wrote of the hope that the study would dispel the "mis-
perception," as he put it, that we are unsympathetic to motions for 
summary judgment. 
The crushing caseload often is the cause of judges pushing 
harder for settlement than otherwise they might. I am not unaware 
that lawyers generally welcome some judicial intervention for settle-
ment purposes and that most, though not all, judges are happy to 
participate in negotiations. Sometimes, however, push becomes 
shove, with unfortunate results for all concerned. I have even heard 
rumors that the attorneys who staff our civil appeals management 
26. E.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1982); FED. R. CIV. P. II. 
27. See, e.g., Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265 (2d Cir. 1986). 
28. 106 S. Ct. 2505 (1986). 
29. 106 S. Ct. 2548 (1986). 
30. Knight v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 9, 12 (2d Cir. 1986) (Feinberg, C.J.). 
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programJt are known to apply the "full court press" in an effort to 
settle appeals. I have no personal knowledge of such things, of 
course. 
Even with the assistance of these CAMP attorneys, the pro se 
attorneys and the motion attorneys who serve our court, we have 
been unable to avoid cutting some comers because of the number of 
appeals. The Second Circuit still allows oral argument to anyone 
who asks. With twenty-seven or twenty-eight appeals per week, 
however, the average time allowed is fifteen minutes per side. I sug-
gest that this is wholly inadequate in most cases, and many attor-
neys have expressed to me their justified frustration at the time 
limitations on argument. Fifty-three percent of our cases in 1985 
were disposed of by summary order rather than by signed or per 
curiam decisions.32 The summary orders are not published and 
cannot be cited,33 much to the chagrin of the bar. I, too, find great 
difficulty with the use of summary orders, but the press of business 
leaves us no alternative. 
There are but two options for those concerned about the future 
of the federal judiciary-continue on the present course, with the 
expectation of incremental caseload increases and with expansion of 
the judiciary continually lagging behind need; or divest and restruc-
ture some jurisdiction while refining procedural rules. As a propo-
nent of the latter course, I offer the following ten suggestions: 
1. Increase the amount in controversy required for diversity ju-
risdiction. I have come to accept the inevitable-that diversity 
never will be eliminated, no matter how much of an anachronism it 
becomes. But give us a break! The amount in controversy figure 
was fixed at $10,000 in 1958. A simple upward adjustment to ac-
count for inflation would help reduce the casefiow. 
2. Fix a statute of limitations for state habeas cases, say five 
years. This would have the salutary effect of bringing the criminal 
litigation to a conclusion as well as cutting our caseloads. I think 
that five years should be enough for anyone to exhaust state reme-
dies and to find any federal constitutional issues. 
3. Require state prisoners to exhaust state administrative rem-
edies before asserting federal constitutional rights respecting their 
conditions of confinement. A federal statute presently allows the 
court to stay such cases for up to ninety days to permit exhaustion 
31. See generally Kaufman, Must Every Appeal Run the Gamut?-The Civil Appeals 
Management Plan, 95 YALE L.J. 755 (1986). 
32. S. FLANDERS, supra note 12, at 6. 
33. See SECOND CtR. R. 0.23. 
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of administrative remedies meeting acceptable standards.J4 This 
statute should be strengthened to allow states the opportunity to 
address prisoner complaints in the first instance. I must admit that 
I was quite confused by the New York State Commissioner of Cor-
rections, who was quoted in the Wall Street Journal as saying that, 
although he spent one-quarter of his time giving depositions in these 
cases, he thought that it was good to have court decisions promot-
ing consistency in the prison system.Js I always thought that that 
was his job! The same article quoted me as saying that inmate liti-
gation is a "problem crying out for a drastic curtailment of jurisdic-
tion in the federal courts." 
4. Cut back the criminal jurisdiction of the federal courts. 
The ever-expanding federal criminal jurisdiction threatens to engulf 
our courts with matters best left to state tribunals. The interests of 
federalism, as well as prudential concerns, argue for restriction of 
federal criminal jurisdiction to matters of true national interest. A 
thorough congressional study should be undertaken, with a view 
toward eliminating a large number of federal crimes duplicative of 
state legislation dealing with the same subject matter. Considera-
tion should be given to conferring upon state courts jurisdiction 
over some federal crimes. Certain federal criminal statutes given 
expansive interpretation because of imprecise language should be 
amended to provide more specific descriptions of the prohibited 
conduct. 
5. Award successful civil litigants all costs and attorneys' fees 
expended in the suit. The American rule36 should be abolished in 
the interest of simple fairness as well as to eliminate frivolous suits. 
I realize that recent attempts to put more bite into the modest fee-
shifting provisions of Rule 68 have not been successful. However, I 
think that the public would approve this proposal overwhelmingly 
if it were put to a vote. 
6. Repeal civil RICO. A compromise bill to restrict the appli-
cation of the civil provisions of RICO failed in the last days of the 
99th Congress.J7 As in most such situations, many interest groups 
had input, and nothing was accomplished. The Senate version of 
the bill was called the "Pattern of Illicit Activity Act," probably 
because it sounded better than "Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 
Organizations Act." Why we need any general federal law relating 
to civil fraud is not clear to me. 
34. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (1982). 
35. Agins, Jailhouse Lawyers: Doing Time Can Mean Having Time to Learn Legal Ins 
and Outs, Wall St. J., Sept. 24, 1986, at 20, col. 2. 
36. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975). 
37. See Strasser, RICO Changes are Blocked, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 27, 1986, at 10, col. 3. 
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7. Eliminate unnecessary appellate argument by prescreening 
appeals. In spite of the Second Circuit tradition, I think it more 
important that selected cases have longer oral argument than that 
every case have some oral argument. Prose litigants provide little 
or no assistance to the court through argument. When the proper 
disposition of a case is apparent from a glance at the briefs, there is 
no need for oral argument. The time is better spent with a case 
worthy of extended attention, and the overall result will be the 
faster movement of cases through the system. 
8. Require Congress to assess the impact on the federal courts 
of all new legislation. The assessment should be appended to each 
bill as a condition of the act's passage, and should include projec-
tions of additional costs and personnel. 
9. Confer exclusive jurisdiction of Federal Employers Liability 
Act cases upon the state courts. There is no reason why railroad 
employees should have a choice of federal or state courts for what 
essentially are local tort actions. 
10. Create an independent commission to study the judicial re-
view of administrative agency decisions. A number of questions 
should be formulated for the commission: What review functions 
should the courts perform? What should be the standard of review? 
Should there be different standards for different agencies? Is judi-
cial review necessary in all cases? Is it necessary in social security 
cases to have review at both the district and circuit levels? Should 
review procedures within the agencies be strengthened? I suggest 
that the answer to these questions may result in legislation lessening 
the work of the federal courts in these areas. 
Some of these proposals may appeal to you; some may not. In 
either case, I invite public discussion about the future of the federal 
courts, as we celebrate the 200th anniversary of the document that 
created them. 
